“百年庆”会计高层次“新财经”学术讲坛

主题：Political cost and non-GAAP disclosure: Evidence from sin firms (政治成本和非GAAP披露：来自罪恶公司的证据)

主讲人：澳大利亚国立大学 Lily Chen 副教授

主持人：澳门bet356体育在线官网 步丹璐 教授

时间：2023年04月09日（周二） 15:15-16:45

会议地点：澳门bet356体育在线官网柳林校区 诚正楼650会议室

主办单位：新时代中国特色财务与会计理论创新与方法体系研究团队 数字经济重大基础理论与实践创新研究团队 澳门bet356体育在线官网 科研处

主讲人简介：

Lily Chen 是会计系副教授。研究兴趣包括财务报告和披露、财务分析师、公司治理、ESG、综合报告和机器学习。Lily的研究成果发表在The Accounting Review, Accounting, Organizations and Society, Journal of Banking & Finance, Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, Journal of Management Accounting Research, Journal of Business Ethics, Accounting and Finance, and Journal of International Accounting Research 等国际期刊. Lily是Pacific Accounting Review 的编辑和Accounting and Finance，Meditari Accountancy Research 的编辑委员会成员. 她还是澳大利亚和新西兰会计金融协会（AFAANZ）的董事会成员。

内容简介： Political cost, reflected through measures like excess profit taxes or regulatory actions, translates to wealth shifts from private to public sectors. While prior studies focus on how firms manage GAAP earnings to lower their political profile, this paper explores corporate non-GAAP disclosures in the context of political costs, particularly focusing on sin firms involved in sectors (alcohol, tobacco, gambling, and firearms) that deviate from established social norms. Sin firms often face stringent regulatory scrutiny, market interventions, and negative media coverage due to their controversial product offerings, which may compel them to adapt their disclosure behaviors to minimize political cost exposure. We provide evidence that managers of sin firms are less likely to provide non-GAAP earnings disclosure compared to matched non-sin counterparts. Our cross-sectional analyses reveal that the negative effect of sin firm status on non-GAAP disclosure is less pronounced in sin firms with political connections and in those with CEOs who have a higher risk-taking tolerance. We also find that managers of sin firms are more likely to disclose non-GAAP earnings that are less profitable than their GAAP counterparts and incur fewer persistent expenses in calculating non-GAAP earnings. In addition, the non-GAAP earnings disclosed by sin firms possess higher quality and are less opportunistic. Our results are robust to alternative explanations, different model specifications, and an exogenous shock experiment. Overall, this paper concludes that political cost considerations shape the corporate non-GAAP disclosure decision.

政治成本通过超额利润税或监管行动等措施反映出来，转化为财富从私营部门向公共部门的转移。虽然之前的研究侧重于公司如何管理GAAP收益以降低其政治形象，但本文探讨了在政治成本背景下的公司非GAAP披露，特别关注涉及偏离既定社会规范的行业（酒精，烟草，赌博和枪支）的罪恶公司。由于其有争议的产品供应，犯罪公司经常面临严格的监管审查、市场干预和负面媒体报道，这可能迫使他们调整其披露行为，以尽量减少政治成本风险。我们提供的证据表明，与匹配的非罪恶公司相比，罪恶公司的经理不太可能提供非GAAP收益披露。我们的横断面分析显示，在有政治关系的罪恶公司和首席执行官风险承受能力较高的公司中，罪恶公司地位对非GAAP披露的负面影响不那么明显。我们还发现，罪恶公司的经理更有可能披露非GAAP收益，这些收益的利润低于GAAP同行，并且在计算非GAAP收益时产生的持续费用更少。此外，罪恶公司披露的非GAAP收益具有更高的质量，并且机会主义更少。我们的结果对替代解释、不同的模型规格和外源冲击实验是稳健的。总体而言，本文得出的结论是，政治成本考虑影响了公司非GAAP披露决策。